Day: November 27, 2025

Prof. (Dr.) Rajiv MathurPartner, MIGS Global Consulting On 10 November 2025, a car exploded near the Red Fort in New Delhi, killing more than a dozen people and injuring many others. The nature of the attack shocked the nation. This was not a crude roadside bombing by fringe actors, but a meticulously planned terror act. What may be even more disturbing is the emerging picture – the people behind it were doctors, highly educated professionals employed by Al-Falah University in Faridabad. As investigations deepen, a pattern is emerging – one that points to a chilling evolution in terrorist recruitment. Terror groups are no longer content with uneducated foot soldiers alone; they are now trying to radicalise white-collar professionals, especially in places we think of as safe – universities, hospitals, academic labs etc. Why a University, Why Doctors? Radicalisation at the Right Age, in the Right Place Radicalisers pick their targets when they are vulnerable – in a ‘tough time’ in life. For medical students or early-career doctors, this is very true. Medical education is grueling – long hours, high stress, emotional trauma, financial pressures, and a strong desire to ‘do better.’ Those pressures can make young professionals susceptible to ideological promises that offer meaning, belonging, and even a kind of ‘jannat’ (paradise) reward. In the Red Fort case, key people involved were doctors from Al-Falah University. Among them were: These are not random, peripheral actors. These are people with education, professional standing, and access to infrastructure (labs, storage, networks). Why might they be appealing recruits? Because: Symbolic Value of Targeting a University A university is not just a physical space; it carries symbolic weight – it is a place of learning, progress, enlightenment. That is what makes it attractive to radical ideology: In the Red Fort case, investigators believe that one of the rooms in the Al-Falah campus (building no. 17, room no. 13) was used as a secret meeting place for the conspirators. According to reports, this room was very close to their lab – underlining how academic infrastructure was allegedly exploited. Security Blind Spots: Why Universities, Hospitals, and Management Institutes Are Vulnerable These are places with minimal security awareness, or where security is not part of the academic curriculum. That is a serious systemic weakness. Lack of Institutional Security Culture Traditionally, universities (especially in India) focus on education, research, and administration. Security is often treated as an operational afterthought – limited to campus guards, typical access control, and maybe CCTV. But deeper security (counter-terror, radicalisation prevention) is rarely part of university planning. Gap in Management Education Even management schools (especially those teaching healthcare management, operations, or supply chain) do not include security modules. This is a serious blind spot. This absence in curriculum means that when radical elements try to infiltrate, they face little institutional resistance or scrutiny. The New Terrorist Playbook: White-Collar Radicalisation The Red Fort incident seems to reflect a dangerous evolution in how terror modules operate. White-Collar Jihadis Many analysts now call this ‘white-collar jihad’ – where terrorists are not uneducated foot-soldiers, but skilled professionals such as doctors, engineers, faculty, researchers. This has several strategic advantages for them: In the case of the Delhi blast, investigators reportedly believe that university labs might have been used to produce or store components for bombs (e.g., RDX synthesis). That’s a terrifying escalation. Also, encrypted communication, digital funding, and cross-border ideological influence seem to be part of the module’s operational design. Recruitment via Academic Networks Recruiters are increasingly using academic and religious networks: This shows a deliberate strategy – using respected professionals as radical agents, embedded in academic institutions, with both ideological indoctrination and operational capacity. Institutional Accountability and Recruitment Failures Point of poor recruitment processes is very concerning, and facts emerging in the case support serious lapses. Questionable Hiring Practices According to reports, one of the detained persons, Mohammad Jamil, was responsible for recruitment at Al-Falah University. Investigators say he forwarded files for doctors’ appointments, raising the possibility of infiltration. There are concerns whether the University did proper background checks. These revelations raise crucial questions about institutional due diligence – what are the checks and balances when hiring critical faculty? Who authorises these appointments, and how rigorous is the vetting? Financial Irregularities and Oversight There are also deeper institutional concerns beyond just hiring: When higher education institutions have weak governance, poor transparency, and limited oversight, it becomes easier for extremist networks to infiltrate and operate under the cover of a ‘charitable’ or ‘educational’ mission. Psychological and Ideological Drivers Let us explore more deeply why radicalisation might work so effectively in such a context. Identity, Belonging, and Purpose Young professionals, especially from marginalized or conflict regions (e.g., Kashmir), may feel alienated. Despite achieving academic success, they may still struggle with: Moral Justification and Religious Framing Terror groups often frame their message in religious-laden moral terms – ‘jihad’, ‘sacrifice’, ‘paradise.’ For educated recruits, this is combined with a narrative of struggle: The contrast between a ‘tough life’ (long study hours, pressure, low recognition) and the promise of spiritual reward (jannat) becomes highly attractive. When radical ideology is wrapped in religious duty, it gives recruits a moral justification for violence – especially if they believe their professional status doesn’t exempt them from ‘sacred struggle.’ Broader Threat Implications What emerged from the Red Fort investigation is deeply worrying – not just for this incident, but for India’s broader national security and academic landscape. What Can Be Done: Prevention, Awareness, Reform Given this emerging threat, what should society, institutions, and government do? Here are some concrete suggestions, informed by your insight and my analysis. Curriculum and Awareness Building Institutional Governance and Oversight Policy and National-Level Response Conclusion The Red Fort blast and the link to Al-Falah University are a wake-up call. Terrorism is changing. Radicalisation is becoming more professional, more white-collar, and more insidious. Traditional security paradigms – focused on uneducated militants – must evolve to meet this new threat. Universities, hospitals, management schools are not just innocuous institutions. They are now…

Milind BorkarStrategic Growth Advisor, Vicon This section is focused on best practices and considerations for integrating elements of airport physical security systems. Systems integration is the coupling of various discrete hardware and software systems into a unified system. The objective of assembling individual pieces into a whole functioning unit often requires detailed planning that clearly defines the operational requirements of the integrated system, the functional requirements of the integrated components, and the internal interfaces between all components as well as all external (input and output) interfaces. Well-conceived and tested, integration can provide the airport operator with several benefits: Integration can also introduce complexities into security system design which are best mitigated by the careful determination of operational requirements (the ConOps process) technical specifications that address component compatibility details, and proof-of-integration testing. The complexity of the process usually necessitates an iterative approach where small pieces are integrated together in steps with each step resulting in a larger functional unit until the whole system is successfully integrated together, so that the end result meets the user’s requirements. Integrated systems can provide a range of decision-making resources and tools for operators. Those tools can automate some response processes (e.g., alert notifications) or guide response actions. Integrated tools also provide platforms through which response activities can be coordinated and directed though a range of tools including radio, data and telephony. Integration Process Figure 1 diagrams the major process for integrating physical security systems. a) Detection/ Perception Airport decision makers can draw upon a variety of system inputs including – Fire Alarms, Pressure Sensors, Motion Sensors, Audio Sensors, Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) including credentialing systems, Perimeter Intrusion Detection Systems (PIDS), Video Surveillance Systems, including both visible CCTV and infrared sensors, Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) systems, Geographical Information Systems (GIS), Building Automation Systems (BAS), CBRNE sensors, Global Positioning System (GPS) data, Network Communications including network monitoring systems, and Human assets equipped with voice or data communications devices-radios cellphones, data terminals. Sensor data may come directly into a common platform, or it may be filtered or prioritized by management software such as VMS, PIDS, BAS or CAD systems. In addition to sensory data there are a range of other information sources that help to develop a picture of an incident or occurrence, i.e., situational awareness. These inputs can include – Event Management Systems (Web EOC, eTeam, Esponder), Work Order and Maintenance Management Systems, GIS Data, FIDS Data, Personnel Data (Biometrics/ Credentialing), Key Control Management Programs, Gate Management Systems, Airfield Management Systems, and Safety Management Systems. b) Assess/ Analyze This phase of the integration process should begin with a ConOps, this being the best means of determining operational requirements from which technical specifications and decision rules can be derived. Some tools like CAD, PIDS, CMMS and VMS programs can help in bringing meaning to differing pieces of data and relating that to action programs. PSIM software generally provide richer integration linking more data fields and supporting security functions across the full operational spectrum. c) Direction/ Response Integration is most effective when it supports the actions of responders. The focus of system integration is to facilitate the operator’s access to and ability to exploit, in real time, information converged from diverse sensors and other inputs. Integration at the system level enables intelligent decision-making to be applied for response functions. This occurs through subsystems designed for task execution including radio/ telephone/ data communication systems; automated command to remote access points or barrier or access control systems; mass notification systems; and alarm/ audio and public address systems. The extent to which these inputs and functions should be integrated will vary for each airport operator. Defining operational requirements by a thorough ConOps is the first step in this process. The criteria for making these decisions should be: The outputs of system engineering will include documentation of the system design, trade-off studies of system and component alternatives, system and component specifications, estimates of probable cost, management plans and schedules, contractual documents etc. Model specifications are available from several sources, but two sections of the Construction Standards Several industry groups have standardized protocols for digital video systems and for their integration with other elements of physical security systems. Their common goal is improved hardware and software compatibility, but each group has its own focus, and their standards differ in important respects including their span of coverage and how they specify and test for compatibility compliance. All of these groups have published specifications and/ or standards, which continue to be developed and refined, and all continue to expand their memberships. Stating that an item of equipment such as a video camera, ‘complies’ with a published industry standard does not assure that it will interoperate with ‘compliant’ products of other manufacturers. Even within a given camera product line, there can be models which comply with a given standards while other models do not comply. Equipment specifications, however detailed, are not sufficient to reveal to an airport operator the full level of operational performance or the compliance of a specific device to a standard. Always check equipment model details against the standards to which they have been tested, and whenever possible physically test the products under local operational and environmental conditions of use. A major issue is often the ability to upgrade or replace an item of hardware or software independently of a manufacturer’s proprietary design data and protocols. Airport design and procurement packages should: Choosing a Platform Before the widespread adoption of networked digital systems, most security systems were integrated around access control devices. Access control systems were the first line of defense, alerting security staff to unauthorized intrusions and providing basic video coverage of these events. Not all incidents are triggered by a physical security breach, nor do all incidents carry a physical security risk. Such incidents are geared more towards airport operations, but nevertheless they are issues that arise and must be addressed. As security systems became more complex, as users increased the quantities of video cameras, and as all of these devices…

Sanjay Dubey Additional Chief SecretaryDepartment of Science and TechnologyGovernment of Madhya Pradesh It began with a simple click. A government official in a small district of Madhya Pradesh opened what looked like a regular circular attachment but within seconds, the system froze, screens went black, and sensitive departmental data was locked behind a ransom note. What could have been a crisis was averted swiftly thanks to a state-level cybersecurity response team that detected, isolated, and neutralized the threat before it spread. This isn’t just a story of prevention – it’s a story of preparation. In an era where every service from land records to education, health, and public safety runs on digital platforms, cybersecurity has become the invisible backbone of governance. India’s push toward Digital India has brought unmatched connectivity, with over 1.15 billion mobile users and 700 million internet subscribers. Yet, this digital vibrancy has also made the country a hotbed for cyberattacks. In 2023 alone, CERT-In (Computer Emergency Response Team – India) handled over 1.5 million incidents, ranging from phishing and ransomware to attacks on critical infrastructure. As these threats multiply, the question facing every state government is not ‘if’ but ‘when’ the next attack will come and how prepared they are to face it. In this high-stakes landscape, Madhya Pradesh has quietly emerged as one of India’s most cyber-resilient states, building not just systems, but a culture of security. The Turning Point: MP-CERT’s Vision for a Secure Madhya Pradesh In December 2022, the Department of Science and Technology, Government of Madhya Pradesh, established MP-CERT (Madhya Pradesh Computer Emergency Response Team) a specialized body designed to protect the state’s digital ecosystem. This initiative positioned Madhya Pradesh as one of the first few states in India to develop a dedicated cybersecurity response system. MP-CERT’s mission goes beyond firewalls and encryption it’s about ensuring that every department, every official, and every citizen becomes a stakeholder in digital safety. Cybersecurity Awareness Month: A Time to Reflect and Reinforce Every October, the world observes Cybersecurity Awareness Month, a global reminder that security is everyone’s responsibility. For Madhya Pradesh, this observance carries special meaning. Since its inception, MP-CERT has driven significant initiatives: Now, building on this foundation, MP-CERT has proposed a specialized 3-day residential training program for Group A and Group B mid-management officers and policymakers, scheduled for 27-29 October 2025 at NFSU Centre, Gandhinagar, Gujarat. The program is designed to impart a holistic understanding of cybersecurity, covering emerging global trends, best practices in cyber defense, and strategic frameworks for policy formulation and implementation. The CISO Network: Building Cyber Leaders Across Government At the core of MP-CERT’s strategy lies decentralized vigilance. The state has appointed 175 Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) across departments and districts, ensuring that cybersecurity isn’t limited to IT cells, it’s embedded within every policy and workflow. To further strengthen this ecosystem: Securing the Code: The SBOM Advantage One of MP-CERT’s most impactful innovations has been the introduction of the Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) methodology. In simple terms, SBOM acts like an ingredient list for software, helping identify vulnerable outdated components in real time. By mapping potential weaknesses to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), MP-CERT has been able to detect and resolve vulnerabilities faster than ever. Key Achievements as of October 2025: Supporting this robust architecture is the State Data Centre (SDC), which is now certified at CMMI Level 5—the highest factory-level standard for data security and quality management. This achievement underscores the precision and rigor of MP’s digital backbone. Every government department developing a new digital service, application, or portal is now mandated to create a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) and conduct a pre-audit at the CMMI Level 5 standard ensuring security is embedded right from the development stage. A Model for Secure Governance The story of MP-CERT is not about crisis management, it’s about confidence. It’s about a state that saw the digital wave coming and built lifeboats before the storm arrived. It’s about transforming cybersecurity from a technical term into a pillar of governance, trust, and innovation. As India accelerates toward its goal of becoming a trillion-dollar digital economy, Madhya Pradesh offers a living example of how digital progress and digital protection must evolve together. From early threat detection and secure coding to awareness campaigns and national cyber drills, the state is demonstrating what it means to move from Digital India to Secure India. The state’s forward-looking approach is now evolving into institutional innovation. Under the newly launched Madhya Pradesh Tech Policies, a Centre of Excellence (CoE) in Cybersecurity is being established to nurture innovation, R&D, and skill-building in collaboration with academia and the private sector. October, the month of cybersecurity awareness, thus serves as a reminder that behind every secure system lies a story of foresight. And in Madhya Pradesh, that story is being written today – one secure byte at a time. *(The views expressed by the author are personal.) Read More

Sreekumar NarayananChief Growth Officer, BNB Security & Automation solutions India’s core sector infrastructure is going through its most exciting and most vulnerable phase. Power plants, refineries, ports, airports, LNG terminals, metro systems, data centres, transmission networks and large logistics hubs are all becoming more digital, more connected and more automated. This brings huge efficiency gains. It also creates new kinds of risk that cannot be handled by ‘security teams’ alone. To protect these assets, India now needs a very different approach. Risk managers, security professionals, IT teams, OT engineers and behavioural scientists must work as one integrated ecosystem. Only then can we protect physical and digital assets, map human and machine activity intelligently and still respect the privacy of employees, visitors and citizens. This article explores why that convergence is necessary, what it looks like in practice and how organisations can move in that direction. What Makes Core Sector Infrastructure So Special? When we talk about core sector infrastructure, we mean assets like: These assets have three common features: 1. High impact A single incident – a fire in a refinery unit, a major substation outage, a pipeline leak, a cyber breach in a control room – can affect millions of people, cause environmental damage and disrupt the economy. 2. Converged environments Inside the same facility you will find: These are increasingly interconnected, which means a weakness in one layer can be exploited to affect the others. 3. Complex human ecosystems Employees, contract workers, shift technicians, drivers, seafarers, pilots, regulators, auditors, visitors and vendors all move through the same space. Their behaviour – deliberate or accidental – can create or reduce risk every day. Because of this, traditional siloed security (guards + cameras + fire alarms) is no longer enough. We need a joined-up approach that looks at risk from multiple angles. Why ‘Activity Mapping’ is the New Core of Protection Earlier, most security planning focused on assets – protect this transformer, guard that control room, fence this tank farm and so on. Today, the more powerful idea is to protect activities and flows around those assets. This includes how people, vehicles and materials move from gate to plant to storage and back; which digital commands go from control room to field devices and under what conditions; or what patterns of behaviour usually precede a safety incident, a leak, an outage or a cyber breach. This is called activity mapping – creating a consolidated, time-based picture of who/what did what, where, when and with which dependencies. Examples in a refinery or power plant: Done well, activity mapping turns raw logs into meaningful stories about how the plant is being used. That is the true foundation of modern asset protection. But this is only possible when: The Four Professional Worlds That Must Converge 1. Risk Management Risk professionals think in terms of Threats (what can go wrong?), Vulnerabilities (where are we weak?), Consequences (what happens if it goes wrong?), and Likelihood (how often might this happen?). In core sectors, they work with frameworks such as ISO 31000 (risk management), ISO 22301 (business continuity) and sector-specific safety standards. Their job in this new world is to: 2. Security (Physical + Cyber) Security teams bring expertise in Perimeter protection (barriers, bollards, fences), Surveillance (CCTV, video analytics, drones, thermal cameras), Access control (badges, biometrics, visitor management), and Cybersecurity (firewalls, endpoint protection, SIEM, incident response). In a converged environment they must: 3. IT (Information Technology) IT teams run data centres and cloud platforms, business networks (LAN/WAN/Wi-Fi) and identity systems, central logging, SIEM and analytics platforms, and endpoint management and patching. In the new model, they play three crucial roles: 4. OT (Operational Technology) OT engineers work with SCADA, DCS, PLCs, RTUs, field instruments; industrial networks (Modbus, Profibus, OPC, IEC 61850, etc.); Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) and emergency shutdown; and maintenance and reliability systems. Traditionally, OT has been air-gapped and isolated. But with more remote monitoring, OEM support and integration with enterprise systems, that isolation is fading. OT’s role in convergence includes: Why Behavioural Science is the Missing Glue Most incidents in core sectors are still linked to human factors: This is where behavioural scientists and organisational psychologists become vital partners. They help in: Understanding ‘normal’ behaviour What is a typical shift pattern for a crane operator? How do technicians really bypass interlocks under pressure? Without this, analytics may treat normal workarounds as ‘suspicious’ or miss genuinely abnormal actions. Designing alerts that humans can handle If operators already see hundreds of alarms per hour in DCS, pushing another 50 ‘security alerts’ on another screen will create fatigue. Behavioural experts help design tiered alerts, colour coding, phrasing and escalation paths that humans can respond to meaningfully. Building a security and safety culture Training, communication, safety observations, peer feedback and leadership behaviours all shape how seriously people take risk. Behavioural science ensures these programmes are realistic, empathetic and grounded in how adults actually learn at work. Ethical use of monitoring If employees feel they are under constant surveillance, trust collapses. Behavioural inputs help design transparent, fair monitoring policies that focus on high-risk zones and actions, not micro-control of individuals. Technical Building Blocks for Converged Privacy-Aware Security While each site will be unique, certain technical building blocks are common across power plants, refineries, ports and data centres. Integrated Command and Control A modern Integrated Command & Control Centre (ICCC) or Security Operations Centre (SOC) brings together: The goal is not just to see more screens, but to build correlated views – ‘Gate 3 badge-in + vehicle number plate + route deviation + door forced in substation + unusual setpoint change in feeder panel’ becomes a single high-priority incident, not five unconnected alerts. Data Architecture and Event Correlation A typical data flow for activity mapping might look like: 1. Collection layer 2. Transport and storage 3. Correlation and analytics 4. Response orchestration OT Security Basics Even at a general level, there are some non-negotiable OT security practices: Privacy-by-Design in Monitoring and Analytics Since activity mapping deals with people as…