White Collar Terror : Why Universities and Doctors Have Become the New Frontier

Prof. (Dr.) Rajiv Mathur
Partner, MIGS Global Consulting

On 10 November 2025, a car exploded near the Red Fort in New Delhi, killing more than a dozen people and injuring many others. The nature of the attack shocked the nation. This was not a crude roadside bombing by fringe actors, but a meticulously planned terror act. What may be even more disturbing is the emerging picture – the people behind it were doctors, highly educated professionals employed by Al-Falah University in Faridabad.

As investigations deepen, a pattern is emerging – one that points to a chilling evolution in terrorist recruitment. Terror groups are no longer content with uneducated foot soldiers alone; they are now trying to radicalise white-collar professionals, especially in places we think of as safe – universities, hospitals, academic labs etc.

Why a University, Why Doctors?

Radicalisation at the Right Age, in the Right Place

Radicalisers pick their targets when they are vulnerable – in a ‘tough time’ in life. For medical students or early-career doctors, this is very true. Medical education is grueling – long hours, high stress, emotional trauma, financial pressures, and a strong desire to ‘do better.’ Those pressures can make young professionals susceptible to ideological promises that offer meaning, belonging, and even a kind of ‘jannat’ (paradise) reward.

In the Red Fort case, key people involved were doctors from Al-Falah University. Among them were:

Dr Umar Nabi: Who allegedly drove the car that exploded near the Red Fort.
Dr Muzammil Shakeel: Whose rented premises yielded massive quantities of explosive material – about 2,900 kg, according to police.
Dr Shaheen Shahid: Another faculty member, allegedly tasked with building a women’s wing of JeM (Jaish-e-Mohammed) in India.

These are not random, peripheral actors. These are people with education, professional standing, and access to infrastructure (labs, storage, networks).

Why might they be appealing recruits? Because:

Professional legitimacy: As doctors, they have credibility. Their public image is trusted. That trust provides cover.
Access to resources: University labs or hospitals may have chemicals, equipment, rooms – places where one could plan or store illicit material if unnoticed.
Mobility and networks: Educated professionals often move across states, or have connections in academic and professional circles. These can be exploited for recruitment, logistics, fundraising, and operational coordination.

Symbolic Value of Targeting a University

A university is not just a physical space; it carries symbolic weight – it is a place of learning, progress, enlightenment. That is what makes it attractive to radical ideology:

Radical groups may see universities as breeding grounds for future cadres – young minds that can be shaped.
For attackers, planning within a university gives a strategic advantage. Authorities may not suspect ‘academic front’ sites as terror incubators.
Using a university also sends a powerful message – that radical ideology has penetrated our most respected institutions.

In the Red Fort case, investigators believe that one of the rooms in the Al-Falah campus (building no. 17, room no. 13) was used as a secret meeting place for the conspirators. According to reports, this room was very close to their lab – underlining how academic infrastructure was allegedly exploited.

Security Blind Spots: Why Universities, Hospitals, and Management Institutes Are Vulnerable

These are places with minimal security awareness, or where security is not part of the academic curriculum. That is a serious systemic weakness.

Lack of Institutional Security Culture

Traditionally, universities (especially in India) focus on education, research, and administration. Security is often treated as an operational afterthought – limited to campus guards, typical access control, and maybe CCTV. But deeper security (counter-terror, radicalisation prevention) is rarely part of university planning.

There tends to be no structured curriculum on radicalisation, or how to spot ideological recruitment.
Faculty hiring and background verification may not include national security risk assessment. In the Al-Falah case, investigators are reportedly probing how some doctors were hired, despite prior red flags.
Laboratories and chemical stores are often managed for academic use, not for risk assessment. Chemicals that are benign for research could be misused if diverted; this risk oversight is often lacking.

Gap in Management Education

Even management schools (especially those teaching healthcare management, operations, or supply chain) do not include security modules. This is a serious blind spot.

Many MBAs, including one specialising in Healthcare Management Programs, teach efficiency, cost management, logistics, but not threat management, risk monitoring, or counter-terror strategies.
Without this, future hospital administrators, operations heads, and managers remain unaware of how security risk intersects with daily functioning – for instance, how a storage room for medical supplies, from security perspective, might store volatile chemicals, or how staff recruitment could be manipulated.

This absence in curriculum means that when radical elements try to infiltrate, they face little institutional resistance or scrutiny.

The New Terrorist Playbook: White-Collar Radicalisation

The Red Fort incident seems to reflect a dangerous evolution in how terror modules operate.

White-Collar Jihadis

Many analysts now call this ‘white-collar jihad’ – where terrorists are not uneducated foot-soldiers, but skilled professionals such as doctors, engineers, faculty, researchers. This has several strategic advantages for them:

Operational Cover: Professionals are less likely to be suspected, especially in academic or hospital environments.
Resource Access: As noted, they may access labs, chemicals, and networks.
Carefully Planned Ideology: These are not impulsive recruits; they may be ideologically groomed, possibly even trained intellectually.

In the case of the Delhi blast, investigators reportedly believe that university labs might have been used to produce or store components for bombs (e.g., RDX synthesis). That’s a terrifying escalation. Also, encrypted communication, digital funding, and cross-border ideological influence seem to be part of the module’s operational design.

Recruitment via Academic Networks

Recruiters are increasingly using academic and religious networks:

In this module, Imam Irfan (also referred to as Maulvi Irfan) is believed to have played a key role in radicalising medical students and acting as a logistics facilitator.
Police sources suggest he used mosque congregations and academic connections in Kashmir to recruit.
The doctor network was not isolated – some individuals had worked in government hospitals, medical colleges in Kashmir, and then moved to Al-Falah in Faridabad.

This shows a deliberate strategy – using respected professionals as radical agents, embedded in academic institutions, with both ideological indoctrination and operational capacity.

Institutional Accountability and Recruitment Failures

Point of poor recruitment processes is very concerning, and facts emerging in the case support serious lapses.

Questionable Hiring Practices

According to reports, one of the detained persons, Mohammad Jamil, was responsible for recruitment at Al-Falah University. Investigators say he forwarded files for doctors’ appointments, raising the possibility of infiltration. There are concerns whether the University did proper background checks.

Dr Umar Nabi, for example, had a troubled past. He had previously worked at a government medical college in Anantnag, but was reportedly ‘sacked’ after a patient died due to his negligence.
Dr. Nisar-ul-Hassan, who once served in Jammu & Kashmir, was reportedly dismissed by the J&K administration in 2023 for terror links, yet appears to have taught later at Al-Falah University.

These revelations raise crucial questions about institutional due diligence – what are the checks and balances when hiring critical faculty? Who authorises these appointments, and how rigorous is the vetting?

Financial Irregularities and Oversight

There are also deeper institutional concerns beyond just hiring:

The Enforcement Directorate (ED) has launched raids at 25 locations in Delhi and Faridabad linked to Al-Falah University, probing possible financial irregularities.
The university is run by the Al-Falah Charitable Trust, led by Jawad Ahmad Siddiqui, whose management and financial practices are now under scrutiny.
Some media reports suggest donations from foreign sources; for example, earlier coverage indicated Arab funding for the trust.

When higher education institutions have weak governance, poor transparency, and limited oversight, it becomes easier for extremist networks to infiltrate and operate under the cover of a ‘charitable’ or ‘educational’ mission.

Psychological and Ideological Drivers

Let us explore more deeply why radicalisation might work so effectively in such a context.

Identity, Belonging, and Purpose

Young professionals, especially from marginalized or conflict regions (e.g., Kashmir), may feel alienated. Despite achieving academic success, they may still struggle with:

Socio-political dislocation: Their communities may be underrepresented, stigmatized, or politically volatile.
Search for meaning: Medicine is often idealistic – many enter to heal, serve, and make a difference. Radical ideology can hijack that drive, promising a ‘higher’ mission – not just healing bodies, but ‘healing’ society through a religious-political cause.
Belonging: Terror modules may offer tight-knit communities, ideological mentorship, and a cause. For someone under stress or disillusioned, this sense of belonging can be intoxicating.

Moral Justification and Religious Framing

Terror groups often frame their message in religious-laden moral terms – ‘jihad’, ‘sacrifice’, ‘paradise.’ For educated recruits, this is combined with a narrative of struggle: The contrast between a ‘tough life’ (long study hours, pressure, low recognition) and the promise of spiritual reward (jannat) becomes highly attractive. When radical ideology is wrapped in religious duty, it gives recruits a moral justification for violence – especially if they believe their professional status doesn’t exempt them from ‘sacred struggle.’

Broader Threat Implications

What emerged from the Red Fort investigation is deeply worrying – not just for this incident, but for India’s broader national security and academic landscape.

Erosion of Trust in Institutions: When a university is implicated in terror, public trust in higher education suffers. Students, parents, and society begin to question whether campuses are safe or complicit. The Association of Indian Universities (AIU) has already suspended Al-Falah University’s membership after these links surfaced. Such incidents deepen fear and mistrust around educational institutions, especially minority-run or private universities, potentially fueling stigma and polarisation.
Strategic Vulnerability: A terror cell embedded in a university can operate with relative stealth. The ability to stockpile explosives (as allegedly happened in Faridabad), plan, and coordinate under cover of academic work is deeply alarming. This model, once proven effective, could be replicated elsewhere. Other radical groups may try to infiltrate universities, hiring professionals, abusing labs, and setting up covert networks. The risk is not limited to one institution.
Challenge for Security Agencies: Intelligence and anti-terror agencies typically focus on ‘traditional’ profiles – militants, armed groups, radicalised youth from madrasas or ghettos. But white-collar terrorism requires a different lens. Monitoring academic institutions, hiring patterns, fund flows, chemical purchases, and suspicious meetings is complicated. There is also a thin line – universities must remain open spaces of learning. Over-policing campuses risks stifling academic freedom.

What Can Be Done: Prevention, Awareness, Reform

Given this emerging threat, what should society, institutions, and government do? Here are some concrete suggestions, informed by your insight and my analysis.

Curriculum and Awareness Building

Security Studies in Management Education: MBA programs (especially in healthcare, operations, supply chain) should include modules on risk management, counter-terrorism, and institutional security. Case studies (like Al-Falah) should be discussed to show how ideological risk can intersect with professional spaces.
Radicalisation Awareness in Universities: Universities should conduct workshops and seminars for students and staff on radicalisation – how extremist ideologies spread, how recruitment works, and how to respond. Encourage peer support systems: Faculty mentors, student counsellors, chaplains/ imams inclusive of moderate voices, mental health professionals – so students under stress have safe, non-ideological outlets.
Background Verification Policies: Universities must institute rigorous hiring practices: Check past employment, disciplinary history, and possible ideological risk factors. For sensitive roles (medicine, chemistry labs), mandatory background checks and security audits could be instituted – vetted by external or regulatory bodies as necessary.

Institutional Governance and Oversight

Stronger Regulation of Private Universities: Regulatory authorities (UGC, state education boards) must enforce stricter financial transparency, governance standards, and periodic audits of private universities. Foreign donations to educational trusts must be closely monitored, especially for institutions that run laboratories, hospitals, or host sensitive equipment.
Security Audits: Universities hosting labs, hospitals, or large residential campuses should perform regular security risk assessments. These would examine chemical stores, access control, room usage patterns, and storage areas. Liaison with local police, anti-terror agencies, and intelligence agencies should not be reactive (post-incident) but proactive – trust-building, threat analysis, and joint preparedness plans.
Whistleblower Mechanisms: Faculty, students, or staff should have safe channels to report suspicious behaviour, or ideological concerns. Universities must protect whistleblowers and act impartially.

Policy and National-Level Response

Inter-agency Coordination: Intelligence agencies, security forces (like NIA), education regulators, and universities must coordinate. A task force can be formed for ‘academic radicalisation’ risk. Monitoring extremist financial flows into educational trusts should be part of wider counter-terrorism strategy.
Preventive Engagements: Governments should support deradicalisation programs tailored for professionals – mentorship, ideological counselling, rehabilitation. Religious institutions and moderate community leaders must be part of this, helping articulate a balanced, mainstream narrative.
National Curriculum Integration: At higher education level, governments or accrediting bodies could mandate security-awareness courses (non-political, academic) as part of professional education (medicine, engineering, management). Scholarships or fellowships could be offered for research into ‘terrorism and higher education,’ to deepen understanding and develop policy-relevant knowledge.

Conclusion

The Red Fort blast and the link to Al-Falah University are a wake-up call. Terrorism is changing. Radicalisation is becoming more professional, more white-collar, and more insidious. Traditional security paradigms – focused on uneducated militants – must evolve to meet this new threat.

Universities, hospitals, management schools are not just innocuous institutions. They are now frontlines in the struggle against radicalism. If we do not take this seriously – by building awareness, strengthening institutional governance, and integrating security consciousness into education – we risk seeing more such modules embedded in our most trusted spaces.

This is more than a security issue – it is a moral and civilizational one. If we fail to act, we may find that the very places built for healing – hospitals, classrooms, universities – become weaponised. But if we act wisely, we can transform them into bulwarks of peace, spaces of resilience, and communities of enlightened resistance.