Rekha GairolaDirector, India – Global Safety & Security, Adobe In an era of high-stakes corporate risk where uncertainty, reputational damage or business disruption is one incident away, the role of the corporate security leader has never been more important. These leaders, in the boardrooms and beyond, are the under-the-radar forces who are ensuring the safety of employees; protecting assets; ensuring a continuity for brands. But even as their job has become more significant and crucial, many security heads are still shut out from strategic decisions. It’s not really about performance, it’s all perception – and the essence of that perception problem is communication.Let’s unpack why communication – the spoken word, non-verbals and vocals, are no longer a ‘soft skill’ for today’s corporate security professional. It is the divide between influence and invisibility. That’s the difference between being perceived as a cost centre, or as a strategic partner. And for most, it is the piece that is missing in their leadership. The Quiet Side of the Corporate Map Corporate security function has evolved at a fairly fast pace in India and at other regions as well. Security teams who used to focus only on guarding and gatekeeping manage a wide spectrum of tasks today – insider threats, investigations, business continuity, regulatory risk, workplace violence and even political intelligence. But they have not ridden this trend to increased access to decision-making rooms. Too often, security is: And the result? A critical function that’s marginalized in business conversations – tools that we need for the future, but no one seems to want them in a business conversation. Why the Gap? A Communication Deficit The disconnect is seldom a failure of expertise. In fact, the vast majority of security people have great operational excellence. But they also stem from military, police or engineering backgrounds, environments that reward directness and execution, not always headline writing and persuasion. This creates a communication gap: And security is in itself, preventive. But here’s the twist – when you successfully avert something, nothing happens. And then when everything doesn’t, you have to tell the audience very clearly and forcefully what could have happened but didn’t. Communication: The Power and Art of Persuasion In this fresh paradigm, communication is not add-on – it’s fundamental leadership capability. As they lead their organizations through multifaceted, complex risk, security professionals must understand the business lens and know how to influence peers across functional lines in building trust at every level. One useful lens through which we can view this is by using Maslow’s Five Levels of Communication: Well, most security communication lives at level 2. Leadership is alive on levels 4 and 5. Here are the 3 Principles Of ‘Leadership Communication’ Verbal: Framing the message A poignant message begins with resonant words. Security executives need to contextualize risk for the business, and not just in technical detail. Examples: Non-verbal: How you show up The way you stand, the way you look, how your eyes meet, what’s on your slides, even what you put in an email, helps shape that message. Confidence attracts attention long before competence. Build executive presence by – when meeting with others, the gestures should be calm and open; designing narratives through crisp and bold visuals; and writing to be read and acted upon. Vocal: The Energetics of Communication Monotone delivery drains attention. Dynamic vocal delivery builds trust. Work on pitch, tone, pausing and modulation to bring energy to your delivery, particularly when giving a crisis briefing or board update. A Missed Opportunity: A True Anecdote I had the pleasure of meeting Rajesh (Changed the name and related info to maintain confidentiality) at a regional leadership workshop in Mumbai. He was responsible for all corporate security at several manufacturing facilities throughout western India. He was battle-tested, unflappable under pressure and had quietly stewarded the city through crises as varied as labor strikes and flood evacuations. During one of the breaks, over a cup of tea, he mentioned something almost in passing – how, a few weeks earlier, his team had quietly leaned on local community leaders to spare his plant from yet another protest before it reached its gates. That one act enabled a full production run to take place, avoided any bad press and ensured that 600 of our employees worked for the rest of the year safely, never knowing there had been a threat. When I asked whether he had brought this up with the leadership team, he shrugged – “It’s part of the job,” he said, “If nothing was done, yeah, we did well.” That moment stuck with me, because it expressed the very challenge this article is concerned with. The point isn’t that security leaders aren’t doing good work it’s that they’re not talking about it. Rajesh didn’t lack impact. He didn’t have an outlet or perhaps license to talk about it in ways the business could relate to and value. And he’s not alone. From one industry to the next, countless professionals like him are cutting down on risk, protecting their companies’ brand reputation and protecting people every day, all while being mostly out of sight for decision makers. So, How Much Is Poor Communication Costing? The results are nuanced, but profound: When security leaders abandon their own voice, others define their value. From Good to Great: What Security Leaders Need to Do Now The Voice Behind the Shield The world does not simply require security professionals to defeat threats. It requires leadership that predicts them, communicates them and affects action. Security is possibly behind, but the voice surely should not be. You already have a seat at the table. Now speak like it! Because when corporate security speaks with authority, the business pays attention. (The author is also an Internationally Certified Life Skills Trainer) Read More

Veena GuptaFounder & MD, Seam Risk Consultancy Executive Protection (EP) is often misunderstood by the general public – and even by many practitioners entering the field. Popular imagery portrays a protector as a tall, muscular figure dressed in black, wearing sunglasses, scanning the environment like a hawk. While physical fitness and vigilance matter, they represent only a fraction of what the profession truly requires. In reality, Executive Protection is not a show of strength. It is a strategic discipline, combining intelligence analysis, risk management, human psychology, logistical planning, and discreet operational execution. It is a profession where small details save lives, and invisibility is often the strongest armour. The myth vs. the reality Most people believe that EP is just about a forceful person specifically with military background, physical intimidation, a certain bodyguard look – walking shoulder-to-shoulder with the principal and similar on. But the truth is simpler – and more demanding. Effective EP is built on the ability to think ahead, anticipate risks, and eliminate them before the principal even becomes aware of them. A protector must be a planner, reader of people, strategist, communicator, and problem-solver. Strength may stop a threat; preparation prevents it entirely. The microscopic details that matter In the field, it is often the small, easily ignored details that define the safety of the principal. These details go beyond the traditional security scope and enter the domain of holistic protection. Consider the following examples – rarely visible to an outsider but critical for an EP operator: 1. Vehicles and drivers 2. Aircraft and charter checks 3. Hotels, dining, and hospitality 4. Movement and logistics These details may appear insignificant, but for EP, the difference between safety and vulnerability is often a matter of seconds – and those seconds depend on preparation. The professional scope of executive protection A skilled Executive Protection Officer must master several core areas such as: Executive Protection (EP) is often misunderstood by the general public – and even by many practitioners entering the field. Popular imagery portrays a protector as a tall, muscular figure dressed in black, wearing sunglasses, scanning the environment like a hawk. While physical fitness and vigilance matter, they represent only a fraction of what the profession truly requires The real definition of executive protection Executive Protection is not a physical shield. It is a mental discipline, a strategic art, and a lifestyle of constant vigilance. It is knowing that a tyre with low air pressure can cause a fatal accident; a small crowd can suddenly become uncontrollable; an unreserved hotel table can create exposure; a distracted driver can become a liability; a wrong seat position in a restaurant can compromise safety; and a pigeon nest on a charter aircraft can delay takeoff and disrupt movement security. Most people see the protector walking beside the principal. They never see the hundred invisible tasks that make that walk safe. Conclusion In every sense, Executive Protection is an art that blends intelligence, discipline, anticipation, and humility. The best protector is not the one who looks dangerous – but the one who thinks deeper, plans wider, and moves smarter. EP is not about muscles – it is about mastery. Read More

Prof. (Dr.) Rajiv MathurPartner, MIGS Global Consulting On 10 November 2025, a car exploded near the Red Fort in New Delhi, killing more than a dozen people and injuring many others. The nature of the attack shocked the nation. This was not a crude roadside bombing by fringe actors, but a meticulously planned terror act. What may be even more disturbing is the emerging picture – the people behind it were doctors, highly educated professionals employed by Al-Falah University in Faridabad. As investigations deepen, a pattern is emerging – one that points to a chilling evolution in terrorist recruitment. Terror groups are no longer content with uneducated foot soldiers alone; they are now trying to radicalise white-collar professionals, especially in places we think of as safe – universities, hospitals, academic labs etc. Why a University, Why Doctors? Radicalisation at the Right Age, in the Right Place Radicalisers pick their targets when they are vulnerable – in a ‘tough time’ in life. For medical students or early-career doctors, this is very true. Medical education is grueling – long hours, high stress, emotional trauma, financial pressures, and a strong desire to ‘do better.’ Those pressures can make young professionals susceptible to ideological promises that offer meaning, belonging, and even a kind of ‘jannat’ (paradise) reward. In the Red Fort case, key people involved were doctors from Al-Falah University. Among them were: These are not random, peripheral actors. These are people with education, professional standing, and access to infrastructure (labs, storage, networks). Why might they be appealing recruits? Because: Symbolic Value of Targeting a University A university is not just a physical space; it carries symbolic weight – it is a place of learning, progress, enlightenment. That is what makes it attractive to radical ideology: In the Red Fort case, investigators believe that one of the rooms in the Al-Falah campus (building no. 17, room no. 13) was used as a secret meeting place for the conspirators. According to reports, this room was very close to their lab – underlining how academic infrastructure was allegedly exploited. Security Blind Spots: Why Universities, Hospitals, and Management Institutes Are Vulnerable These are places with minimal security awareness, or where security is not part of the academic curriculum. That is a serious systemic weakness. Lack of Institutional Security Culture Traditionally, universities (especially in India) focus on education, research, and administration. Security is often treated as an operational afterthought – limited to campus guards, typical access control, and maybe CCTV. But deeper security (counter-terror, radicalisation prevention) is rarely part of university planning. Gap in Management Education Even management schools (especially those teaching healthcare management, operations, or supply chain) do not include security modules. This is a serious blind spot. This absence in curriculum means that when radical elements try to infiltrate, they face little institutional resistance or scrutiny. The New Terrorist Playbook: White-Collar Radicalisation The Red Fort incident seems to reflect a dangerous evolution in how terror modules operate. White-Collar Jihadis Many analysts now call this ‘white-collar jihad’ – where terrorists are not uneducated foot-soldiers, but skilled professionals such as doctors, engineers, faculty, researchers. This has several strategic advantages for them: In the case of the Delhi blast, investigators reportedly believe that university labs might have been used to produce or store components for bombs (e.g., RDX synthesis). That’s a terrifying escalation. Also, encrypted communication, digital funding, and cross-border ideological influence seem to be part of the module’s operational design. Recruitment via Academic Networks Recruiters are increasingly using academic and religious networks: This shows a deliberate strategy – using respected professionals as radical agents, embedded in academic institutions, with both ideological indoctrination and operational capacity. Institutional Accountability and Recruitment Failures Point of poor recruitment processes is very concerning, and facts emerging in the case support serious lapses. Questionable Hiring Practices According to reports, one of the detained persons, Mohammad Jamil, was responsible for recruitment at Al-Falah University. Investigators say he forwarded files for doctors’ appointments, raising the possibility of infiltration. There are concerns whether the University did proper background checks. These revelations raise crucial questions about institutional due diligence – what are the checks and balances when hiring critical faculty? Who authorises these appointments, and how rigorous is the vetting? Financial Irregularities and Oversight There are also deeper institutional concerns beyond just hiring: When higher education institutions have weak governance, poor transparency, and limited oversight, it becomes easier for extremist networks to infiltrate and operate under the cover of a ‘charitable’ or ‘educational’ mission. Psychological and Ideological Drivers Let us explore more deeply why radicalisation might work so effectively in such a context. Identity, Belonging, and Purpose Young professionals, especially from marginalized or conflict regions (e.g., Kashmir), may feel alienated. Despite achieving academic success, they may still struggle with: Moral Justification and Religious Framing Terror groups often frame their message in religious-laden moral terms – ‘jihad’, ‘sacrifice’, ‘paradise.’ For educated recruits, this is combined with a narrative of struggle: The contrast between a ‘tough life’ (long study hours, pressure, low recognition) and the promise of spiritual reward (jannat) becomes highly attractive. When radical ideology is wrapped in religious duty, it gives recruits a moral justification for violence – especially if they believe their professional status doesn’t exempt them from ‘sacred struggle.’ Broader Threat Implications What emerged from the Red Fort investigation is deeply worrying – not just for this incident, but for India’s broader national security and academic landscape. What Can Be Done: Prevention, Awareness, Reform Given this emerging threat, what should society, institutions, and government do? Here are some concrete suggestions, informed by your insight and my analysis. Curriculum and Awareness Building Institutional Governance and Oversight Policy and National-Level Response Conclusion The Red Fort blast and the link to Al-Falah University are a wake-up call. Terrorism is changing. Radicalisation is becoming more professional, more white-collar, and more insidious. Traditional security paradigms – focused on uneducated militants – must evolve to meet this new threat. Universities, hospitals, management schools are not just innocuous institutions. They are now…

Milind BorkarStrategic Growth Advisor, Vicon This section is focused on best practices and considerations for integrating elements of airport physical security systems. Systems integration is the coupling of various discrete hardware and software systems into a unified system. The objective of assembling individual pieces into a whole functioning unit often requires detailed planning that clearly defines the operational requirements of the integrated system, the functional requirements of the integrated components, and the internal interfaces between all components as well as all external (input and output) interfaces. Well-conceived and tested, integration can provide the airport operator with several benefits: Integration can also introduce complexities into security system design which are best mitigated by the careful determination of operational requirements (the ConOps process) technical specifications that address component compatibility details, and proof-of-integration testing. The complexity of the process usually necessitates an iterative approach where small pieces are integrated together in steps with each step resulting in a larger functional unit until the whole system is successfully integrated together, so that the end result meets the user’s requirements. Integrated systems can provide a range of decision-making resources and tools for operators. Those tools can automate some response processes (e.g., alert notifications) or guide response actions. Integrated tools also provide platforms through which response activities can be coordinated and directed though a range of tools including radio, data and telephony. Integration Process Figure 1 diagrams the major process for integrating physical security systems. a) Detection/ Perception Airport decision makers can draw upon a variety of system inputs including – Fire Alarms, Pressure Sensors, Motion Sensors, Audio Sensors, Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) including credentialing systems, Perimeter Intrusion Detection Systems (PIDS), Video Surveillance Systems, including both visible CCTV and infrared sensors, Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) systems, Geographical Information Systems (GIS), Building Automation Systems (BAS), CBRNE sensors, Global Positioning System (GPS) data, Network Communications including network monitoring systems, and Human assets equipped with voice or data communications devices-radios cellphones, data terminals. Sensor data may come directly into a common platform, or it may be filtered or prioritized by management software such as VMS, PIDS, BAS or CAD systems. In addition to sensory data there are a range of other information sources that help to develop a picture of an incident or occurrence, i.e., situational awareness. These inputs can include – Event Management Systems (Web EOC, eTeam, Esponder), Work Order and Maintenance Management Systems, GIS Data, FIDS Data, Personnel Data (Biometrics/ Credentialing), Key Control Management Programs, Gate Management Systems, Airfield Management Systems, and Safety Management Systems. b) Assess/ Analyze This phase of the integration process should begin with a ConOps, this being the best means of determining operational requirements from which technical specifications and decision rules can be derived. Some tools like CAD, PIDS, CMMS and VMS programs can help in bringing meaning to differing pieces of data and relating that to action programs. PSIM software generally provide richer integration linking more data fields and supporting security functions across the full operational spectrum. c) Direction/ Response Integration is most effective when it supports the actions of responders. The focus of system integration is to facilitate the operator’s access to and ability to exploit, in real time, information converged from diverse sensors and other inputs. Integration at the system level enables intelligent decision-making to be applied for response functions. This occurs through subsystems designed for task execution including radio/ telephone/ data communication systems; automated command to remote access points or barrier or access control systems; mass notification systems; and alarm/ audio and public address systems. The extent to which these inputs and functions should be integrated will vary for each airport operator. Defining operational requirements by a thorough ConOps is the first step in this process. The criteria for making these decisions should be: The outputs of system engineering will include documentation of the system design, trade-off studies of system and component alternatives, system and component specifications, estimates of probable cost, management plans and schedules, contractual documents etc. Model specifications are available from several sources, but two sections of the Construction Standards Several industry groups have standardized protocols for digital video systems and for their integration with other elements of physical security systems. Their common goal is improved hardware and software compatibility, but each group has its own focus, and their standards differ in important respects including their span of coverage and how they specify and test for compatibility compliance. All of these groups have published specifications and/ or standards, which continue to be developed and refined, and all continue to expand their memberships. Stating that an item of equipment such as a video camera, ‘complies’ with a published industry standard does not assure that it will interoperate with ‘compliant’ products of other manufacturers. Even within a given camera product line, there can be models which comply with a given standards while other models do not comply. Equipment specifications, however detailed, are not sufficient to reveal to an airport operator the full level of operational performance or the compliance of a specific device to a standard. Always check equipment model details against the standards to which they have been tested, and whenever possible physically test the products under local operational and environmental conditions of use. A major issue is often the ability to upgrade or replace an item of hardware or software independently of a manufacturer’s proprietary design data and protocols. Airport design and procurement packages should: Choosing a Platform Before the widespread adoption of networked digital systems, most security systems were integrated around access control devices. Access control systems were the first line of defense, alerting security staff to unauthorized intrusions and providing basic video coverage of these events. Not all incidents are triggered by a physical security breach, nor do all incidents carry a physical security risk. Such incidents are geared more towards airport operations, but nevertheless they are issues that arise and must be addressed. As security systems became more complex, as users increased the quantities of video cameras, and as all of these devices…